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LIBERALISM AND SOCIAL JUSTICE

The Rawlsian Mirror of Justice

Jessica Flanigan

L

ibertarians (like me) generally disagree with orthodox
Rawlsians (like Samuel Freeman) about whether
Rawlsian principles of distributive justice are
compatible with libertarianism.1 In this essay, I set out
to explain why. In section 1, I describe the problem,
which is essentially that libertarians think the Rawlsian framework
does not rule out anti-statist, capitalist, and broadly libertarian
approaches to distributive justice and orthodox Rawlsians think
that it does. I propose that this problem arises because the
Rawlsian framework is underspecified in two ways. First, the
Rawlsian framework has a lot of moving parts, so people with
different pre-theoretical intuitions can use Rawls’s theory, without
error, to arrive at very different conclusions. I make this point in
section 2. Second, orthodox Rawlsians advance justice as fairness
at an intermediate level of idealization. In section 3, I argue that
pitching the theory at this level inherits many of the problems with
I’m using the term libertarian to refer to libertarians but also people who are
classical liberals, and anarchists. I realize these terms are imperfect. Basically, I’m
referring to political philosophers who are especially pro-market and anti-state.
This term contrasts with what I’m calling Orthodox Rawlsians, who are
comparatively less friendly to markets and more statist.
1
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a non-ideal approach that addresses specific problems with the
status quo as well as the problems with a purely ideal approach that
addresses the motivating ideals and values. This approach also
obscures more than it illuminates to the extent that it is often
unclear whether arguments at this level of analysis are justified on
principled or pragmatic grounds.
Together, these two kinds of under-specification result in a
theory that is indeterminate between competing conceptions of
distributive justice. Since the theory cannot specify which
conception of distributive justice is preferable, then proponents of
competing conceptions must either defend a more determinate
interpretation of the theory or defend their conception of
distributive justice on the grounds that do not rely on Rawlsian
premises. In section 4, I argue that proponents of competing
conceptions of distributive justice should defend their views
without reference to the Rawlsian framework. I favor this
approach because attempts at defending more determinate
interpretations of the Rawlsian theory shift the terms of debate
from a discussion about distributive justice to a discussion about
Rawlsian exegesis and interpretation. But exegetical disputes often
reflect substantive disagreements about what distributive justice
requires, rather than the other way around. Since Rawlsian
interpretation supervenes on underlying disagreements about
distributive justice, Rawlsian scholars who disagree about Rawlsian
distributive justice are more likely to identify the crux of their
disagreement by talking about distributive justice than by talking
about Rawls.
It is for these reasons that I view Rawlsian distributive justice
as a mirror. When libertarians look at the framework, they can see
their own values staring back at them. Liberal egalitarians take a
look and assert that the picture they see is quite different. Both
sides report what they see in the mirror without error. Yet, it would
70
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be an error to suggest that the image in the mirror is fixed. And it
is an even greater mistake to think that the image in the mirror can
show us anything more than the world that it reflects.
I
The Disagreement
In Liberalism and Distributive Justice, Samuel Freeman situates the
disagreement between libertarians and liberal egalitarians as
primarily a disagreement about three things – the value of equality,
the status of economic freedom, and the legitimacy of public
power.2 Yet most libertarians, classical liberals, and anarchists are
as committed to equality as Rawlsians (if not more so), but they
believe in a different interpretation of what equality requires.
Libertarians reply that the same reasons for the non-basic status of
economic freedom would also weigh against the basic status of
core liberal freedoms, such as freedom of speech and association.3
In response to Freeman’s concerns about private power,
libertarians reply that the reasons Freeman gives for the
illegitimacy of private law enforcement weigh with equal force
against public power as it operates in most contexts.4
These debates are well-worn within the libertarian/orthodox
Rawlsian egalitarian discourse. I am not the first to point out that
By this I mean that Freeman argues against libertarianism, or a more general
laissez-faire economic approach on the grounds that it does not account for
distributional equality (Freeman 2018, 180-184) that it recognizes economic
freedom as a basic liberty (ibid., 170), and that it denies the legitimacy of public
exercises of power while viewing private contracts as presumptively legitimate
(ibid. 62-89).
3 Cf. Flanigan 2018.
4 Cf. Freiman 2017.
2
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a great deal of the Rawlsian architecture does not necessarily rule
out libertarianism, despite the claims of most orthodox Rawlsians.
Tomasi’s argument that economic liberties should be considered
basic liberties is perhaps the most influential entry in this genre.
Tomasi argues that economic liberties, like other basic liberties, are
important for the development of citizens’ moral powers. The
moral powers refer to the capacity for citizens to develop and
pursue a conception of the good and to recognize others’
entitlements to do the same.5 Jason Brennan argues that,
empirically, societies with high levels of economic freedom also
seem to promote Rawlsian aims better than societies that restrict
economic freedom.6 In policy circles, many libertarians make the
case capitalism is generally to the benefit of the least advantaged
relative to other economic systems, and that restrictions on
economic freedom are counter-productive.7 Chris Freiman argues
that Rawlsians should either be more skeptical of political liberty
or more open to economic freedom because, in non-ideal contexts,
both fail to promote justice for similar reasons. 8 Loren Lomaski
re-imagines to the Rawlsian framework to show that it could
plausibly support fairly Nozickian conclusions.9 And I’ve argued
elsewhere that orthodox Rawlsians should uphold seemingly
illiberal unconscionable for egalitarian reasons—to avoid black
markets and governmental paternalism.10
Whatever one thinks of the merits of these arguments, they are
clearly granting the premises of Rawlsian liberalism. So why do
proponents Rawlsian accounts of distributive justice, like Freeman,
Cf. Tomasi 2013.
Cf. Brennan 2012.
7 See e,g. humanprogress.org, which describes the benefits of economic
liberalism.
8 Cf. Freiman 2017.
9 Cf. Lomasky 2005.
10 Cf. Flanigan 2017.
5
6
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persist in rejecting libertarianism as an admissible theory of justice?
And why have libertarians, like me, failed to see why the Rawlsian
account of distributive justice rules out their views? The answer to
both questions is that the Rawlsian framework is under-specified
and intractable, despite Rawls and Rawlsian’s considerable efforts
at clarifying, defining, and defending the view. Actually, the fact
that clarifying, defining, and defending the view has occupied so
much of the twentieth, and now twenty-first-century political
philosophy is further evidence of the under-specification and
intractability of the framework.
II
Extensional Adequacy, Parsimony, and Specification
Justice as fairness, like all philosophical models of justice, is a
model.11 Models make it easier to understand complex processes
by representing the world in a simpler way. For example, models
in science and social science help people understand why things
happen the way they do, or they predict what might happen under
certain conditions.12 In philosophy, a good model can help people

Rawls 1971, 52.
For example, good separation-of-powers models are similar to the
governmental institutions they represent. They include the most relevant
participants in policymaking but not all stakeholders or influencers. They
represent participants' preferences over policy outcomes as convex preferences
for an ideal point on a scale of possible policies, even though such scales rarely
represent any actual policy, and participants' preferences over alternatives may
not be symmetrical or convex. They describe the rules that participants must
follow to pass policy but fail to capture informal social norms. Yet even though
these models do not include all the information about policymaking that could
be relevant, they are very informative at predicting policy outcomes and
11
12
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understand how concepts hang together and how different views
have different tradeoffs.13 As Williamson writes, models are
especially helpful in branches of philosophy that deal with “the
human world in all its complexity and mess,” where we are unlikely
to discover exceptionless general principles but where we can still
learn about underlying human phenomena by developing better
models.14 Since political philosophy is exceptionally focused on the
human world in all its complexity, model building is an especially
promising approach for political philosophers. Rawls, who was
very influenced by economic modeling, models justice through the
mechanism of the original position.15
Principles of good modeling provide several methodological
desiderata for political philosophers who are interested in building
models to discover the truth about justice.16 For our purposes, let’s
focus on three—extensional adequacy, parsimony, and
specification. Consider first extensional adequacy or intuitive
plausibility. Intuitions play a central role in ethical theorizing.17
Some philosophers suggest that people cannot avoid using
intuitions about cases when answering questions about

understanding why public officials make the choices they do. Cf. Krehbiel 1998;
Cameron 2000.
13 Cf. Sellars 1963.
14 Cf. Williamson forthcoming.
15 Cf. Forrester 2019, Wolff 2015.
16 For a more comprehensive discussion of theoretical virtues in explanatory
models, see Schindler 2018.
17 For example, Rawls's influential method of reflective equilibrium is generally
applied in a way that gives a great deal of weight to whether a premise of an
argument or its conclusion is intuitively plausible. I discuss this method in more
detail in section 4.
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ethics.18According to Rawls, intuitions that represent earnest and
stable considered judgments are of central importance when evaluating
a theory of justice.19 If a coherent theory, such as utilitarianism,
clashes with people’s case-based intuitions about what justice
requires, Rawls views this class of intuitions as a reason to reject
the theory, despite its other theoretical virtues.20
A model of justice is extensionally adequate if it brings people's
theoretical intuitions into coherence with their specific intuitions
about how just distribution would look. Rawls claims his model of
justice as fairness is “a better match with our considered judgments
on reflection” than competing models.21 He then writes, “Thus,
justice as fairness moves us closer to the philosophical ideal; it does
not, of course, achieve it” (Rawls 1971, 50). After all, Rawls
acknowledges, it is unclear whether reflective equilibrium
converges on a unique answer. “It would be useless, however, to
speculate about these matters,” Rawls writes, going on to say that
if nothing else “if we should be able to characterize one (educated)
person’s sense of justice, we should have a good beginning toward
a theory of justice” in the same way that understanding one
person’s sense of grammar is likely to reveal the general structure
of a language (ibid.).
Another desideratum for models is parsimony. Parsimonious
models are more useful because it is easier to see how the model
See, e.g., Kagan 2001, Harman 2014. Other philosophers question whether
there is a single thing that we could call ‘intuitions,’ and if so, if they can be
considered as evidence in conceptual analysis or moral theorizing.
19 For a further discussion of the distinction (if any) between intuitions and
considered judgments see Daniels 2003.
20 Freeman 2007, 33. Cf. Rawls 1971, 47-53
21 For Rawls, these “traditional doctrines” were utilitarianism and what he called
perfectionism. Rawls 1971, 123.
18
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generates predictions, explanations, or justifications and to identify
points of disagreement. And as Williamson writes,
the more adjustable parts a model has, the more opportunities it
offers the model-builder to rig the results, to gerrymander the model
by setting parameters and arranging structure in ad hoc ways to fit
preconceived prejudices. Simplicity, elegance, symmetry, naturalness,
and similar virtues are indications that the results have not been so
rigged. Such virtues may thus ease us into making unexpected
discoveries and alert us to our errors.22

The temptation to rig the results is strong in political
philosophy, where people have very strong normative intuitions
about justice, and there is reason to suspect that those intuitions
may be unreliable, driven by identitarian or partisan biases.23 A
model of justice is parsimonious if it is simple and precise. A model
of justice is simple if it does not contain so many parameters that
it becomes unclear which considerations explain the models'
implications about a just distribution of resources. A model of
justice is precise if each parameter is described in a way that is clear
and observable. For example, anyone adapting or applying the
model should be able to easily know what each parameter entails
and what it would mean for that parameter to change.
The temptation to rig the results is even stronger in political
philosophy where people evaluate theories partly based on whether
they get the "right" results. For this reason, the value of parsimony
weighs against the value of extensional adequacy. More
parsimonious models present fewer opportunities for the theorist
to deliver her preferred conclusions about particular cases. A very
parsimonious model is more likely to deliver results that are
22
23

Cf. Williamson, forthcoming.
Cf. Ivengar and Westwood 2015.
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extensionally inadequate because it is unlikely to offer many
opportunities for adjustment and accommodation to people's
intuitions. In contrast, a perfectly extensionally adequate model
would simply be a report of the modeler’s observations and
intuitions, and it would not have independent explanatory or
predictive power.
A third virtue is specification. A model is under-specified if it
does not generate a determinate, specific outcome. A model of
distributive justice is under-specified if people can use it to support
a very broad range of distributive principles. On the face of it,
Rawls's theory doesn't appear under-specified because the theory
supports two fairly explicit principles, and Rawls defends a specific
interpretation of those principles. Yet the same theory, in other
hands, has deployed Rawls's two principles to support greatly
divergent principles. If the purpose of a theory of distributive
justice is to represent or explain the conditions when some
distribution of resources is just, then the model is under-specified
if it marks out a range of conditions that could be just, even if
Rawls and Rawlsians don’t see it that way. Under-specification for
models of distributive justice is especially objectionable if it marks
out conditions that are inconsistent with each other. Sometimes,
libertarians argue that their interpretation of justice as fairness is
entirely with the standard account (e.g., when they argue that,
empirically, libertarian policies are the best route to Rawlsian
justice).
If a model is under-specified, it may seem more likely to be
extensionally adequate to the extent that people can adapt it to fit
with their considered judgments. But if a model is under-specified,
it is extensionally inadequate in a different sense—when people
disagree about which adaptation or interpretation of the model is
the correct one. In these cases, the model itself cannot adjudicate
these disputes because people could deploy the model and get
77

Philosophy and Public Issues – Liberalism and Social Justice

different results without misinterpreting the model in any way.24
And then, if people must appeal to other values to defend the
version of the model that yields their favored specification, the
model is less informative and, therefore, less functional.
III
Moving Parts
Justice as fairness has a lot of moving parts. Rawls’s view of
reflective equilibrium allows ‘extensional adequacy’ to outweigh
theoretical parsimony.25 Justice as fairness is not parsimonious. So
Rawlsians can pull the levers and turn the gears of the theory at
many different points, which creates problems of specification.
For this reason, the model can support a range of different
conclusions, which reflect the different dispositions of the people
who deploy it. This feature of Rawls’s model makes it difficult to
make progress in debates about distributive justice because
theorists who take on the theory from different starting points can
use the same Rawlsian premises to deliver conclusions from
democratic socialism to market democracy.

Rawls makes a similar point, not about justice as fairness, but about
metaphysical views of the self, epistemology, and scientific knowledge. As I am
using the term, Rawls thought these theories were underspecified in that they
did not mark out a specific moral theory or conception of justice as the right
one. For example, against Hare, Rawls argued that a conceptual analysis of moral
terms could not itself justify utilitarianism on the grounds that moral terms
contain certain formal properties. My claim is that Rawls's view is underspecified
in a similar way, in that a range of views are, in principle, compatible with the
principles Rawls defends (Freeman 2007, 312).
25 Freeman 2007, 32.
24
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This point is related to, but distinct, from more general critiques
of reflective equilibrium that suggest that the method is too
conservative because it privileges widely shared judgments over
revisionary claims.26 A substantial challenge to reflective
equilibrium in political philosophy is that it is especially sensitive
to the speaker or audience's pre-philosophical intuitions about
cases or theories, and people using the method could arrive at
different conclusions without misapplying the method in any
way.27 An added challenge for arguments about justice as fairness
is that they not only rely on reflective equilibrium, but the Rawlsian
theoretical architecture presents so many opportunities for good
faith interpretive disagreements that the theory rules out very few
conclusions at the outset.
Here is an example of how justice as fairness is unable to
adjudicate disputes between competing interpretations of the
model. Rawlsians claim that justice as fairness requires protecting
basic liberties and promoting distributive justice. Libertarians grant
these principles but interpret the first principle of justice in a way
that includes economic liberty is one of the basic liberties worth
protecting. Orthodox Rawlsians reject this interpretation of the
basic liberties.
Here is another example. Freeman argues that public officials
should enforce limits on freedom of contract because unlimited
freedom of contract would entail that people could voluntarily sell
themselves into slavery, and officials would be required to uphold
those contracts.28 Presumably, Freeman presents the fact that
Cf. Cath 2016.
Cf. Kelly and McGrath 2010.
28 It is also worth noting that many libertarians, including Murray Rothbard,
endorse a conception of freedom of contract that is very similar to Freeman’s.
So endorsement of voluntary servitude agreements is surely not essential to
libertarianism. For an overview of these arguments see Block 2003.
26
27
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protecting economic liberty as basic would, in practice, make
people complicit in upholding voluntary servitude agreements as a
reductio of libertarianism. At the same time, I imagine that the fact
that protecting freedom of expression as basic would make people
at public universities complicit in protecting illiberal and offensive
speech is not a reductio of liberalism. This aspect of the argument
illustrates the earlier point about reflective equilibrium. The
outcome of Rawls’s theory of justice is very sensitive to people's
pre-theoretic intuitions people view a counterintuitive implication
of freedom of contract as disqualifying for economic liberty but do
not take a similarly counterintuitive implication of freedom of
speech as disqualifying that liberty.
More generally, Rawlsians agree that public officials should
tolerate some illiberal behavior, such as illiberal speech in public
spaces. And they agree that officials should accommodate some
illiberal acts, such as hierarchical and illiberal marriages, or illiberal
religious practices that require public accommodation. Libertarians
may interpret this case for accommodation to support
accommodation for some illiberal economic arrangements as
well.29 On behalf of orthodox Rawlsians, Freeman rejects this
interpretation, on the grounds that economic contracts are
importantly different from private social and cultural agreements.30
On this point, Freeman introduces a distinction between economic
and non-economic contracts and then deploys that distinction to
justify limits on economic contracts. Similarly, Rawls and Freeman
distinguish personal property from productive property.
Libertarians deny the assertion that these distinctions track
qualitatively difficult activities. They argue that to the extent that
Flanigan 2017.
As an aside, it’s unclear why educational contracts and nonprofits would be
non-economic here. Freeman 2018, 182.
29
30
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institutions uphold freedom of association, religious liberty,
occupational freedom, and the right to personal property, they
should also uphold economic liberty that includes the right to own
productive property and make contracts.31 So Libertarians arrive at
substantially different conclusions by denying a single distinction
while accepting the rest of the view. Or, they could deny a different
part of the model, such as Freeman’s suggestion that freedom of
contract and the right to own productive property is not essential
to the development of the moral powers. Because the model has
so many moving parts, motivated reasoners in all corners can
adjust and interpret various distinctions to arrive very divergent
conclusions about justice.
Another example. Rawlsians support the difference principle,
which requires that social and economic inequalities should be
arranged to the benefit of the least advantaged. Libertarians argue
that the difference principle supports welfare state capitalism,
which requires protections for freedom of contract and property
rights because this system is the most likely to support long-run
growth, which maximally benefits the least advantaged.32
Proponents of property-owning democracy argue that this claim
results from a misinterpretation of the difference principle, which
“should not be interpreted to require maximizing long-run income
growth” but should focus instead on those who are currently the
least advantaged.33 Or they argue that the institution of freedom of
contract should ensure that economic contracts are to the benefit
of the least advantaged, in addition to a broadly progressive
approach to taxation and property.34
Freiman and Thrasher 2019, 33.
Tomasi 2013; Brennan 2007.
33 Lister 2018.
34 Freeman 2018, 167-194.
31
32
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One last example-- this time with socialists. Cohen argues that
the difference principle should apply to individual attitudes and
choices as well as institutions. Freeman replies that “these
arguments misinterpret the nature and role of Rawls’s principles of
justice, especially the difference principle,” because the difference
principle is correctly understood as a non-consequentialist
representation of what “democratic reciprocity at the deepest
level” would look like in a society. A proponent of Cohen’s
position may reply that this either begs the question against his
view by defining the difference principle in a way that only applies
to institutions, or that the “democratic reciprocity at the deepest
level” would inform individual attitudes as well as the structure of
institutions. And so on.
Many of these debates take a similar form. Orthodox Rawlsians
claim that the correct interpretation of some aspect of the Rawlsian
model (M) rules out libertarianism, or socialism, or whatever.
Proponents of these views reply that such an interpretation M
either begs the question against their view by ruling it out via
definition, or they offer an alternative interpretation of M.
Orthodox Rawlsians come back with the claim that the
unorthodox interpretation of M conflicts with their considered
judgments, and so they reject that the best version of the theory
supports unorthodox conclusions. The unorthodox reply that the
orthodox interpretation conflicts with their considered judgments,
and so they reject the orthodox interpretation.35
The Rawlsian framework is flexible enough for libertarians to
agree with orthodox Rawlsian premises while adapting them to
deliver libertarian conclusions. This aspect of the view is only a
limitation to the extent that justice as fairness aspires to give
general, determinate guidance about how the basic structure of
Some press a parallel claim in the philosophy of religion. See Draper and
Nichols 2013.
35
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society should look. It's not clear that it must, though. In the
original version of A Theory of Justice, Rawls writes, “reflective
equilibrium . . . is a notion characteristic of the study of principles
which govern actions shaped by self-examination” (Rawls 1971,
48). But Rawls’s framework aspires to more than self-reflection.
Orthodox Rawlsians present justice as fairness as a framework that
can tell us all how to live together. This is why they assert that
libertarians are mistaken, rather than just different, when they read
the Rawlsian project to have different implications than the
standard interpretation.
IV
Intermediate Idealization
Just as models must make tradeoffs between parsimony and
extensional adequacy, models also must make tradeoffs between
degrees of idealization and degrees of realism. All models are, to
varying degrees, idealizations. In moral and political philosophy, all
models of justice make tradeoffs between realism and idealism.
Justice as fairness is a model of a “realistic utopia” that aims to take
people as they are by assuming that people respond to incentives
and act in their self-interest (realism) while also telling what they
should aim for (idealism).36 The best case for this intermediate level
of idealization is that the theory can be psychologically convincing
This is why, on the one hand, Freeman responds to Sen's argument that the
Rawlsian project is excessively idealized, by pointing out that political
communities need ideals by which they can judge current policies. But on the
other hand, Freeman also rejects the utopianism of anarchists like GA Cohen
and libertarians like Jason Brennan on the grounds that principles of justice must
be psychologically realistic and engaged with public concerns.
36
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without entrenching injustice.37 The best case against this
intermediate level of idealization is that it describes a conception
of citizens that is idealized in a way that makes the theory
inapplicable to existing people and institutions while also failing to
describe a vision of society that really is morally best.38
David Enoch makes a similar point about idealization in
arguing against public reason liberalism. Enoch’s point generalizes
to other aspects of Rawls’s framework that appeal to an
intermediate level of idealization. Enoch begins with a theory of
when idealization is appropriate. He argues that it is appropriate to
idealize when the reason for idealization is consistent with the
In a way, this problem is similar to three other criticisms of the Rawlsian
project – criticisms of the concept of legitimacy, the original position, and public
reason. Against the concept of legitimacy, critics ask why a society should
tolerate unjust policies (entrenching injustice) simply because they meet some
procedural criterion, which is, by stipulation, not a criterion related to justice but
some other value? On the other hand, rejecting procedural constraints seemingly
undermines the stability of the liberal project because people are unlikely to
support or comply with political decisions they didn’t have any opportunity to
influence (failing to take people as they are). Or, against the original position,
critics argue that Rawls’s model idealizes away most of what matters for political
disagreement (failing to take people as they are) or that it entrenches too many
of people’s unjust dispositions (entrenching injustice). Against public reason,
critics allege that orthodox Rawlsians cannot defend an intermediate level of
idealization about who counts as ‘reasonable’ because the reasons in favor of
excluding the unreasonable are also seemingly reasons to exclude the reasonable
but unjust (failing to take people as they are). Yet any reason to include unjust
or illiberal views is also a reason to include unreasonable views (entrenching
injustice). Freeman 2018.
38 Note that this objection is distinct from the worry that ideal theory does not
deliver achievable and desirable solutions to institutional failures. (See
Stemplowska 2008) I grant that a theory can be valuable even if it does not
deliver these results. My claim is that any reason to idealize to the point that
Rawls does is a reason to idealize further or to favor a theory that does deliver
an achievable and desirable solution.
37
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underlying motivation for the view and not introduced as an adhoc way of avoiding obvious counterexamples.39 There must be a
rationale for idealization that explains why this kind and this level of
idealization is informative for explaining the underlying
phenomenon.
As an example of intermediate idealization, consider Enoch’s
case of public reason theories of legitimacy. If legitimacy requires
justifying state power to the actual people who are subject to them,
then no actual states are legitimate. Rawlsians are not anarchists.
They seek a theory that can explain how states can be legitimate
while accounting for the idea that legitimacy does require some
kind of justification. Rawlsians then argue that states are legitimate
if they can be justified to people under some idealized
conditions—either if they can be justified to everyone except the
unreasonable or if they can be justified by considering what people
would endorse under hypothetical conditions. Enoch replies that
these idealized conditions are not related to the underlying
motivation for the view (justifying state action to those who are
actually subject to it) and that they are also ad hoc because they
define unreasonable people or idealized conditions a way that is
not theoretically motivated, but which neatly rules out any
counterexamples that would be a challenge to the view.
A similar dynamic plays out in Rawlsian discussions of
distributive justice. Say that motivation for Rawls’s theory of
distributive justice is to describe an economic order that respects
every person’s status as a free and equal member of society. The
original position achieves this by describing the economic
institutions that people would support under conditions that
prompt them to consider the economic order impartially.40 But the
39
40

See Enoch 2015.
Freeman 2007, 126.
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difference principle describes institutions that would be supported
under conditions of full compliance, or what Rawls sometimes
describes as “nearly full compliance”.41 This is the level of
idealization that encounters a problem like the one Enoch
identifies with public reason theories. The justification for the
idealization to full compliance is not motivated by the theory's
aspiration to model what people would choose under impartial
conditions. Rather, the idea is that it is necessary to know what
principles people would support in ideal conditions of full
compliance in order to know what principles people should
support in non-ideal conditions that fell short of full compliance.42
But idealizing on the dimension of compliance, rather than
some other dimension, potentially stacks the deck in favor of the
difference principle by building into the concept of full compliance
a level of compliance that rules out compliance with a more robust
egalitarian or altruistic ethos but rules in compliance that exceeds
the levels of compliance in existing societies. As in the case of
public reason then, the idealization of full compliance is unrelated
to the underlying motivation for the view (modeling what people
would choose under impartial conditions) and idealizing in this way
is also potentially ad hoc, because it defines a level of compliance
in a way that rules out alternative conceptions of distributive justice
that would be a challenge to the difference principle.
This intermediate level of idealization on the dimension of
compliance results in a kind of intractability that is similar to what
Enoch observes in discussions of public reason. When libertarians
discuss distributive justice in ideal theory, they claim that ideally,
people who complied with principles of just acquisition and
transfer would comply with property rules that enabled them to
41
42

For a further discussion of this point see Freiman 2017, 13.
Freeman 2007, 472.
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arrive at non-statist solutions to public goods problems, and the
best society would be a capitalist one.43
Rawlsian critics reply that such an argument is unrealistic and
that capitalism is structured in a way that necessarily causes vast
concentrations of wealth and persistent inequality – no amount of
compliance with principles of justice can solve these structural
problems.44 So at the other end of the idealization spectrum,
economists and libertarians may acknowledge that inequalities of
class and wealth are a consequence of people acting in their own
self-interest rather than complying with the rules of just
institutions. But they then argue that the disadvantages of selfinterested behavior weigh against governmental solutions because
non-compliant people would capture the coercive power of the
state for their own advantage.45 On this view, the fact that people
are not immune from self-interest and free-riding is a reason to
avoid concentrating power in political institutions where
monopoly power is even more destructive than monopoly power
in the marketplace.46
Either way, at the level of ideal theory or at the level of nonideal theory, libertarians argue that the difference principle is not
supported. To deliver the difference principle, the idealization of
full or nearly full compliance must be interpreted in a way that is
Cf. Brennan 2014; Freiman 2017.
Property owning democracy and liberal socialism, Freeman writes, are more
likely to achieve the Difference Principle than capitalism because capitalism “by
nature” creates substantial inequalities and a privileged class of people who
control most of the productive wealth. Freeman 2018, 127
45 Freiman calls this the behavioral symmetry standard. Freiman 2017.
46 Freiman’s point is that if some other system could, at its best, be superior to
capitalism, it must be compared to capitalism at its best as well. If capitalism fails
because of individual corruption, free-riding, weakness of will, or inefficiency,
these factors are also likely to weigh against alternative political and economic
arrangements with equal force.
43
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controversial to libertarian interlocutors. When libertarians
disagree with the claim that the economic order would resemble
the difference principle in ideal theory, they needn’t reject the
Rawlsian aspiration to understand justice by modeling what people
would choose under impartial conditions where everyone
complied with justice. Rather, they deny the intermediate level of
idealization involved in the Rawlsian interpretation of compliance.
A similar move occurs in Rawlsian discussions of economic
freedom. Consider Freeman’s claim that distributive justice “would
not permit the laissez-faire doctrine of caveat emptor” and that the
difference principle would support implied warranties in contracts
that ensured consumer protection, laws against predatory lending,
and the unconscionability doctrine in contract law.47 On Freeman’s
view, the laissez-faire doctrine of caveat emptor would be incompatible
with promoting a fair distribution of advantage, even if it included
the standard protections that proponents of a laissez-faire system
endorse, such as laws against fraud and misbranding. But here
again, it’s unclear what level of idealization to apply to this claim.
In practice, limiting the public enforcement of contracts can be
counter-productive because it limits the options of the leastadvantaged and may cause some people to resort to privately
enforced lending and labor agreements, which are not subject to
democratic oversight and which potentially riskier than public
enforcement.48 In principle, laws against fraud and misbranding
should be sufficient to ensure consumer protection, and
restrictions on people’s ability to freely negotiate the terms of their
labor or to decide what to buy would be paternalistic.
Or, return to Freeman’s voluntary slavery argument. 49 Freeman
argues that since “contract and property are matters of publicly
Freeman 2018. 181
Cf. Flanigan 2017.
49 This view is similar to Seanna Shiffrin’s (2000).
47
48
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enforceable right,” upholding voluntary slavery contracts consists
in imposing duties on all citizens that they respect their fellow
citizens’ private agreements as valid, as long as people voluntarily
agreed to the terms.50 But in ideal theory, Jason Brennan argues
that if people all complied with principles of justice, and all people
had a substantial social safety net, then they would not engage in
exploitation and voluntary slavery agreements would not be an
issue. Or, Chris Freiman argues that public officials' refusal to
uphold such contracts is consistent with libertarianism since
people's rights to make contracts do not include rights to public
enforcement.
At the other end of the spectrum of idealization, the closest
thing to voluntary slavery agreements currently arise in
circumstances where people’s institutions have failed them so
much that they are willing to migrate and work in a different
illiberal society where they lack legal rights and are obligated to
work until the end of their labor agreement.51 In these cases,
Freeman’s objection that “society is called upon …treat a person
not as a being with rights due moral consideration and respect, but
as property” doesn’t apply.52 The presence of these labor
agreements reflects a preexisting lack of moral consideration and
respect for foreigners, which is embedded in public institutions,
not the other way around. And because voluntary slavery
agreements generally arise in conditions that are already illiberal, so
they do not call upon liberal members of a society or liberal public
officials to uphold and enforce agreements that are contrary to
liberal values. Moreover, in these unfortunate circumstances, no
Freeman 2018, 66.
This may describe the experiences of migrants who work in Qatar, for
example, where the legal system grants foreign workers very few legal rights and
workers are very vulnerable to fraud and abuse. Cf. Morin 2013.
52 Freeman 2018, 66.
50
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one who is discussing distributive justice, including libertarians,
would defend the fraudulent and abusive conditions that
characterize most of these arrangements, even if libertarians
would, in principle, support the enforcement of a truly consensual
agreement that took this form. On the libertarian view, the
problem with seemingly voluntary slavery agreements isn't that
public officials and citizens are expected to uphold them. The
problem is that too often, such agreements are not actually
voluntary. So, at either end of the spectrum of institutional
idealization, voluntary slavery agreements do not require public
officials to uphold and enforce contracts that are inconsistent with
liberal values.
Freeman does not direct his argument against libertarianism at
the level of fully ideal theory or at the level of actual policy. The
intermediate level of institutional idealization derives principles of
justice by imagining that people are better than they are, but only
in particular ways.
Conclusions
So far, I introduced a problem – which is that libertarians and
orthodox Rawlsians talk past each other because the theory is
under-specified. Orthodox Rawlsians write as if the theory clearly
delivers their preferred specification, but it can’t be that clear if
libertarians keep disagreeing! At this point, it may seem that the
solution to the problem would be to refine and specify the
Rawlsian framework even further, to make it even clearer so that
it delivers more determinate results. Yet this exercise is what
generated the problem in the first place. As philosophers refined
their versions of orthodox and unorthodox Rawlsiansism to
deliver more determinate results, the theory became more specified

90

Jessica Flanigan – The Rawlsian Mirror of Justice

for those who were developing it but less plausible to people who
disagreed.
Justice as fairness begins as a single path, but it cannot end in a
single place. In order to know which theory of distributive justice
is the right one, it’s not enough to consult justice as fairness
because it doesn’t rule out much. Rather, the theorist must appeal
to other values in order to explain why she chose to take the path
of property-owning democracy, rather than market democracy, as
she walked the Rawlsian path. But then, once we reach the
intersection and it’s time to make that choice and justice as fairness
cannot help, it’s unclear why we walked down the path in the first
place. Rather than talking about justice as fairness, which can
support a range of interpretations about distributive justice, the
theorist of justice may as well just argue for her favored theory of
distributive justice in its own right.53
The foregoing discussion of Rawlsian distributive justice
illustrates the broader point. Libertarian proponents of freedom of
contract argue that Freeman is holding the liberties he values
(speech, expression) to lower justificatory standards than he
applies to economic liberties, but that the Rawlsian framework
should support the basic status of economic freedom, even if that
would require revisions or reinterpretations of Rawls’s theory of
David Enoch makes a similar point about public reason liberalism. Rather
than talking about whether a view is reasonable or whether public reason
liberalism can support it, people should just debate the merits of a view
straightforwardly. On Enoch’s view, people should focus their disagreement on
the content of what they disagree about, not on whether the parties to the
disagreement are reasonable. Similarly, I am arguing that people should focus
their conversations about justice on the considerations in favor of theory A or
B, rather than focusing on whether the interpretation of justice as fairness that
supports theory A or B is correct. Cf. Enoch 2013 and Enoch, Against Public
Reason.
53
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distributive justice. Orthodox Rawlsian reply that the Rawlsian
framework does not support the basic status of economic freedom,
because libertarians are misinterpreting what it means for a liberty
to play a role in the development of citizens’ moral powers, so no
revisions to the Rawlsian theory of distributive justice are needed.
The disagreement about freedom of contract shifts to a dispute
about the meaning of terms like “moral powers” of “basic liberty”
rather than addressing the substantive issue of whether public
officials may permissibly limit citizens’ ability to make legally
binding contracts.54 This is a methodological point, and a similar
point might arise in discussions of the Rawlsian methodology itself.
Methodological objections can be re-cast as misinterpretations of
the procedure or of concepts like “considered judgment,” rather
than refuted with arguments about how to make tradeoffs between
theoretical virtues.
Perhaps it’s time to travel off the beaten paths. The Rawlsian
model gave us a way of talking about the different ways that
institutions affect our lives, and it clarified the terms of important
debates about the value of freedom and extent that public officials
should uphold particular property rules, create public services, and
enforce protections for various liberties. But the Rawlsian model
doesn’t tell us what theory of distributive justice is correct. Because
the model has many moving parts and because its standards of
evaluation depend so much on whether the model yields
“extensionally adequate conclusions,” Rawlsian arguments may
now tell us more about their Rawlsian authors than they tell us
about justice.
Katrina Forrester recently arrived at a similar conclusion on
different grounds. She writes,

54

Cf. Chalmers 2011.
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Perhaps it is time to see the dominant philosophical liberalism of
the late twentieth century not as the primary resource for political
philosophers but as one doctrine among many and to understand
Rawls's theory as a discrete chapter in the history of political
thought.55

How might political philosophy look going forward? My
tentative suggestion is that the aforementioned concerns about
reflective equilibrium and intermediate levels of idealization weigh
in favor of a more piecemeal approach at the level of non-ideal
theory and a simpler, more unified approach to theorizing about
justice at the level of ideal theory.
To illustrate the more piecemeal approach, recent entries in
libertarian political philosophy may be a helpful guide. When they
are not addressing orthodox Rawlsianism directly, libertarians
generally argue against specific policies from a pluralistic moral
foundation. For example, they argue against existing restrictions
on specific liberties, such as limits on the right to own a business,
minimum wage laws, maximum hour laws, occupational licensing
requirements, the right to hire immigrants, bans on payday lending,
zoning regulations, and laws that criminalize entire occupations,
e.g., sex work, and policies that empower public officials to seize
people's property for the sake of public projects. Feminist critics of
Rawls take up a similar strategy. 56 In contrast, Freeman does not
discuss any of these policies at length—most go unmentioned. But
if the foregoing arguments are right, the Rawlsian approach could
Forrester 2019, 279.
See e.g. Okin’s discussion of Rwals. Jaggar expands on the methodological
implications of Okin’s critique. Cf. Okin 1989 and Jaggar 2015.
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weigh in favor (or against) any of these policies in the right (or
wrong) hands. If so, then the Rawlsian apparatus is unlikely to be
especially helpful in informing specific policy debates or advancing
revisionary, new positions.57
A disadvantage of the piecemeal approach is that it’s difficult to
know why the proposals on offer are the right ones without
appealing to a general, theoretical model. For this reason, simple,
abstract, theoretical frameworks are useful for identifying
inconsistencies in people’s beliefs and thereby challenging people’s
beliefs about public policy. These ideal theories can inform how
we evaluate existing institutions, or they can simply serve as a
vision of the truth.58 Understood in this light, maybe the Rawlsian
framework is one ideal theory among many.59 But if orthodox
Rawlsianism aims to serve as an ideal that informs existing
institutions, then its indeterminacy undermines the usefulness of
the theory even as a guiding ideal. And even if orthodox
Rawlsianism could deliver a determinate vision of the truth of how
we ought to live together, other ideals are seemingly more
appealing.

Hare makes a point like this. Hare 1973, 145 writes, “Since the theoretical
structure is tailored at every point to fit Rawls’ intuitions, it is hardly surprising
that its normative consequences fit them too – if they did not, he would alter
the theory ... and the fact that Rawls is a fairly typical man of his times and
society, and will therefore have many adherents, does not make this a good way
of doing philosophy.”
58 Estlund 2019.
59 As Forrester writes, rejecting Rawls’s model as the primary resource debates
in political philosophy opens up new possibilities, where proponents can defend
theories of justice on equal footing, each as one doctrine among many, on their
own terms rather than on the contested and slippery terms that have evolved
over the last half-century of Rawlsian discourse.
57
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Catholics call Mary the Mirror of Justice because she is without
sin, so she can perfectly represent an image of God’s goodness.
The face of God is surely a compelling ideal. But Rawls was
dismissive of a religious approach to justice.60 So in justice as
fairness, Rawls created his own mirror of justice, which aimed to
present a secular image of how we could live together.61 Like the
image of Mary, justice as fairness is offered as a tool. But when we
see things in Rawls’s mirror, we see them dimly. We see only part
of what justice requires because we can’t see beyond our own
distorted reflection. It’s time to put down the looking glass and see
each other face to face.

University of Richmond

Freeman 2018, 9-11
For a further discussion of the claim that Rawls was still, in some way, engaged
in a theological project, see Nelson 2019.
60
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